

Pan-Africanism and the State of Politico-Economic Integration in Southern Africa

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The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the colour-line - the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea -

W.E.B. Du Bois, 1900.¹

Abstract

Socio-politico-cultural, economic and strategic realities of the southern African sub-region of Africa brought about the need for the coming together of its member states, though amorphous in the formation, to address their common overarching economic problem in South Africa. The geographic, economic and colonial factors in the sub-region prior to the 20th century, formed a series of politico-economic and security implications. The same cemented the first generation of the sub-region political elite together to wage liberation war against first Portuguese colonial domination of Angola and Mozambique, second Rhodesia (Zimbabwean) and third, South Africa. The offshoot of this anti-colonial and the anti-apartheid systems are linked with the zeal at which

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the DuBoisian prophecy affected Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah in fighting against colonialism and racism in Africa. The liberation of southern African Lusophone states and Zimbabwe (the perceived economic giant in the sub-region) brought about the formation of a politico-economic group: the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). The germaneness of forming a united front against white racism and an urge to foster economic development amongst the member states against economic dependence on the Pretoria government during the apartheid regime loomed large in its formation. The end of the apartheid system and eventual coming to power of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa elicited another hegemonic rivalry in the newly created Southern African Development Community (SADC) to accommodate South Africa. Political rivalry between Harare and Pretoria led to the incorporation of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as a member of the politico-economic organization. The political, economic and strategic implications of the African Renaissance, another fashion of Pan-Africanism that is tacitly rejected by some SADC states as South Africa's grand-design to economically and socio-politically dominate them, is an issue that students of southern African politics still contend with.

Introduction

Political developments in the southern African sub-region during the colonial era could have been the main factor that contributed to the longevity of minority regimes in the area. Geographically and historically, the area through the East and Central African regions is the main theater of colonial and apartheid dominations. In terms of climatic factors, the areas with Mediterranean like climates are conducive for the Europeans who came to Africa for various reasons, but

primarily for economic exploitation. There is a lot of literature that traces the coming of the white to the shores of Africa, mostly from the Netherlands, Germany, Portugal, Belgium, Italy, Spain and Britain. Because of the climatic conditions of southern Africa, the small impact of the winds of change that blew across the continent against foreign domination were felt in the political arrangement of the sub-region. The colonial struggle in the Lusophone states, Namibia and Zimbabwe prolonged liberation wars that were supported by the two ideological and incompatible blocs of the East and the West. The need to fight against color discrimination and political liberation of blacks at the global level brought about the formation of the Pan-African movement.

The Pan-African movement was formed toward the end of the 19th century with the aim of fighting against the color bar against blacks in America. Pan-Africanism, according to Immanuel Wallestein (1961: 103), is a loose term and covers several different movements. It came about to address three major issues: first, as an avenue for the black Americans and West Indies to fight against racial discrimination and to trace their roots back to Africa; Second, it was used to support the political agitation of African nationalists immediately after the World War II; and third, it was used as a weapon to fight against racial subjugation in the southern African states and to establish a supranational states.² The last point is the main departure of our concern.

Between 1919 and 1945, five Pan-Africanist conferences were organized by W.E.B. Du Bois, who is now regarded as "the father of pan-Africanism". The 1945 conference could be said to be the most provoking one because some of the latter nationalists from Africa participated in the conference and the same continued to influence their attitudes towards colonialism in Africa. Some of the participants from Africa,

such as Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyata, Obafemi Awolowo and H.O. Davies (Davies 1989: 123), went back to their respective countries to fight against colonial domination. They later received political independence for their states. In a bid to forge political and economic cooperation among African states, Kwame Nkrumah sponsored, with the help of George Padmore, a Trinidadian, All-African People's Organisation (AAPO) and the Conference of Independent of African States (CIAS) in 1958 to further agitate for the political liberation of Africa.

This had a direct impact upon South African politics. South Africa was invited to the conference of Independent African states, but it refused to attend because colonial powers in Africa were excluded. Not attending the conference was an attempt to continue its political and economic grip in South West Africa (Namibia). No other region in Africa (except perhaps, North Africa -Algeria) became involved in intensive liberation wars against the European in Africa other than southern Africa.

The use of force against colonialists can be traced to the fifth Pan-Africanism Congress (1945) which called for the use of armed conflict to decolonize Africa if the European states refused to grant political freedom to the colonial states. Moreover, the genesis of Pan-Africanism can be traced to events in 1887 in Philadelphia and Boston that transformed into the Free African Society and the Free African Lodge. These moves were solidified through the London conference of July 1900 which called for the independence of the African and West Indies colonies. The conference specifically addressed a protest letter to the Queen of England, Victoria, about the treatment of African blacks in South Africa and Rhodesia (Ajala 1998: 63).

The South Africa sub-region did not experience a smooth transition to political independence. This is because of the complex interdependent nature of the region and, in particular, the influence of South Africa. Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and South West Africa entered into wars of liberation against their colonial metropolis. This was against the relatively smooth transitions in Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland (who formed core members of the frontline states against South Africa) and the DRC. Because guerilla warfare was occurring in these states, issues of Pan-Africanism acquired a firm root as a result of the solidarity support they received from other members of the Frontline States. In particular, Pan-Africanism issues benefited from the influence of Zambia and Tanzania. South Africa's war of terror against the frontline states brought about the formation of the SADC to monitor economic and political developments among the member states. However, this association could not achieve much in the area of economic development because of Pretoria's anti-liberation posture that resulted from the economic sabotage of member states. The post-Cold War period brought about the independence of Namibia and the eventual democratization of South Africa. The implication of this was the re-admission of South Africa to the comity of nations against its pariah status. This admission had both positive and negative impacts on the sub-region. It provided military as well as relative political and economic stability to the area. Pretoria's intention to remain as the only credible hegemonic power in the sub-region continues to affect the economic development of the region. Suspicion by the other members of the organization in terms of the holistic concept of security is germane in their uneasy relationship. This will last for some time to come because of the complex interdependent

relationship in southern Africa in which South Africa and perhaps Zimbabwe have enormous roles to play.

This paper is divided into eight parts. Part one is the general introduction. Part two focuses on the theoretical explanation of the problem at hand. Part three examines the political and economic development in the sub-region during the colonial era. Parts four and five discuss political and economic relations between 1960 and 1990. Parts six and seven look into SADC military, political and economic relations with the member states. Finally, part eight is the conclusion.

2. COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE THEORY

Because international politics is a parasitic discipline that hinges on so many other subjects, in most cases, one theory is not adequate to analyze South African international relations (Garnett 1984:27-50). Because of this problem, this paper's intension is to employ the interdependence theory with an emphasis on the complex interdependence theory in analyzing the relationship between South Africa and the rest of the southern African states.

Main futures of complex interdependence:

1. There are multiple channels of interaction such as inter-states of realist school; trans-government relations, where the input of different government department and various parastatals play a vital role in communalizing states relations; and transnational non-state actors such as liberation movements, religious movements, trade unions, multinational corporations and the likes equally play vital roles.
2. There is an absence of a hierarchical system where issues of high and low politics are less relevant. This thesis is of the belief that the military, politics,

- economics, society and cultural play prominent roles at different times, depending on issue at hand.
3. There is what one could term as unity and inclusion. That is, all member states in a system are sensitive to actions and inactions of any member states either on domestic or foreign policy issue.
 4. The degree of vulnerability to member policies depends on the import of goods and services contributed by the said state to the system. It has little to do with the level of political, economic and social developments of the other members in question.
 5. It erodes the notion of total autonomy and sovereignty of different units to the whole system. More emphasis is placed on sharing of sovereignty on three levels: international legal, Westphalian/Vatellian and domestic (Krasner 2004:88, 1999:9-25).
 6. Military power can be employed only as a last resort when the *leitmotif* of a state is in danger. It is also relevant when supranational organizations, such as SADCC and SADC use it to preserve stability in a designated area or to fight against non-members of a system.

In social sciences, a theory may not be adequate to analyze states relations and behaviors. For the purposes of this paper, futures of integration theory like the absence of force and coercion and the use of collective action to promote mutual interests are equally prominent with complex interdependence theory (Evans & Newnham 1998:254).

Interdependence means that changes or events in any single part of a system will (sensitive effect) produce some reaction from or have some significant consequence on other actors of the system *whether they like it or not* (Russet & Starr

1992:439). Keohane and Nye (1987:364) believe that the need for interdependence could be couched from the need to achieve all what could not be realized in isolation. It emphasizes the links or interconnectedness among the units of a system. Such links may affect both the opportunities of states and the willingness of decision makers to act. These links can be likened to economic, political or social incremental integration. As much as this can generate stability, predictability, regularity, unity, growth and development, it can also breed frustration, anger, instability, competition and conflict. It may be asymmetrical where one of the units (usually the centre) in a system tends to benefit more than the others (periphery states). However, when it is symmetric (an ideal type that hardly met), it connotes that members mutually benefit and consequently, less of conflict arises among the members (Keohane & Nye 1987:365).

Due to the high degree of interdependence in all facet of international relations, there are some elements of sensitivity among states in the whole system where action or inaction of a member state affect others, at least in the short term. Therefore, all state in a designated system are sensitive to changes in the rules of transaction; regardless of if they are policy, social or economic changes. On the other hand and in the long term, vulnerability may be the type of relationship. This is a scenario whereby there is unequal exchange (asymmetrical relationship) in a system under consideration. In some cases when a state is vulnerable to other's policies (the inability of state A to absolve the cost B imposed on it due to its internal or foreign policy) the vulnerability could lead to conflict and the use of military power. The most vulnerable states are not necessarily the most sensitive ones (Keohane & Nye 1987: 368).

Increases in the interconnectedness of states not only bring the concept of sovereignty into question, but it also questions the existence of international relations and causes transnational relations to be viewed more as relations amongst states that have gone beyond state-centric decision making. The movement of goods, ideas and information across borders “without significant, direct participation or control by high-level governmental actors” of which states have no control over (Russett & Starr 1992:443) signifies a need to revisit the relevance of international relations. The permeability of state brings into prominence the import of Non-governmental Organizations (NGO’s). Even at the government level, sub-national actors (part of bureaucracy) do relate with their counterparts from other state without the knowledge of national government (mostly on highly sensitive security matters).

Unlike the realist’s school of thought, where military security and the use of force are important, the *autonomy dilemma* scenario makes states consider the input of non-state actors (liberation movements) in policy-making, making them to be vulnerable to each other. Worth nothing is that the issues that are central to the interdependence thesis are not static; therefore, strict hierarchical system of high and low politics believed by the realist school is not attainable in the complex interdependence school. Military capability of a state is not fungible in achieving socio-cultural, political and psychological interdependence (Russett & Starr 1992:445). Domestic politics or economics can influence international economics and politics and vice versa, the degree of sensitivity and vulnerability are the only things that differ.

As mentioned above, the use of military means to achieve state objectives has changed from state-to-state activities and has come to impact non-state actors such as

terrorist movements, guerrilla fighters, supranational organizations, international organizations and transnational institutions. Although the West perceives the activities of terrorist movements as horrendous, states continue to recognize their importance in international relations and therefore, have links with them through negotiation. For instance, South Africa engaged ANC in secret talk before Mandela was released from prison (Mandela 1994: 452-3).

Externality in the complex interdependence theory, unlike the private goods where the law of supply and demand determines its availability, addresses people's choices and the way those choices harm and benefit others (Russett & Starr 1992:451-2). This brings this study into what are termed as collective goods. This describes when member states equally benefit either positively or negatively on supplied goods, that is, the unity and inclusiveness of the supply (Russett & Starr 1992:453). There is another type of interdependence termed vulnerability or *forced-rider* where the cost of collective goods supplied by a member state is forced on all members in a system. Although there are some pockets of conflicts among the states, there is still a need for them to come together for collective goods. Another problem associated with interdependence is what is called *the tragedy of the common which brings ruin to all*.³ It also makes states ignore their responsibilities as the member states will always seek to maximize their share of the common goods, even when their supply is limited. Having examined the theory of complex interdependence, the next section shall address the suitability of the theory in assessing the political economy of the southern African states in the apartheid and the post apartheid relationship.

Colonial Era and Politico-Economic Cooperation in Southern Africa

It is the belief of some scholars of African politics that the *leitmotif* of pan-Africanism was the need to establish economic cooperation among the member states. In East Africa, the nationalists rejected federation of states imposed on them by the colonialists because of the likely domination of the settlers in the political arrangement of the post-colonial states. Instead of this, they opted for the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA). Julius Nyerere prefers to delay the political independence of Tanganyika (Tanzania) until the two other East African states (Uganda and Kenya) receive their independence from Britain. This move can be viewed as an aspect of pan-Africanism. As much as this thesis holds water for economic integration in Africa in general, other nationalists, such as Kwame Nkrumah, did not understand it in the same way. He instead called for *political independence first before other things will be given*. In southern Africa, the scenario is an admixture of economic and political integration. The three High Commission Territories of Basutholand (Lesotho), Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Swaziland governed from the United Kingdom Colonial office refused incorporation into the Union of South Africa. As early as 1903, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) became members of the Southern African Custom Union (SACU). The economic implications of that were that member states shared a common currency and monetary policy. The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) was their central banker. Proceeds from exports of member states were in the hands of South Africa, and they imported almost all their goods for survival from the apartheid government (Blumenfeld, 1992:109-118). Any negative perceptions of the BLS countries by South Africa implied starvation and political instability. Politically, South Africa found it easy to install a trusted friend as a leader in any of the three states. This contributed to the neutrality of

Botswana in the power politics of and the anti-apartheid struggle in the region (Amusan 2006: 117-8). This was a result of the geographical peculiarity of the sub-region. For instance, Lesotho is a landlocked state like the other two states but, most importantly, it only shares territory only South Africa. The same thing affected political development in the colonial Franco-central African states where DRC, a member of the SADC belongs geographically.

France was conscious of the African nationalists movement towards amalgamation of colonial states. Paris made it a policy to disintegrate these states for its economic exploitation. This could have caused political instability immediately after the DRC received its independence from Belgium. Belgium had ruled DRC as a unitary state with some administrative decentralization. The intension of the Belgian government was to continue its economic exploitation of the territory with the aim that the federal system of the state, with its attendant on economic disarticulation, would plunge Kinshasa into political instability (Ake 1981: 43-4). While planning another fashion of Pan-African system by the Belgian government, France was of the view that disintegration of the states would further its economic motive therefore, Joseph Kasavubu was encouraged to form Bakongo separatist movement (Wallerstein 1961: 113). As much as the colonialists differ in the unity of Africa, they did not encourage a federation that would cut across colonial language and demarcation spheres.

One of the lapses of the 1945 Manchester Pan-Africanists movement was its concentration on political freedom without linking the same with economic development in the African states. This, ironically, was corrected in the case of the southern African states because of the South African apartheid system, which gave little room for

independent coterminous states to develop economically outside the tutelage of Pretoria.

The impact of liberation movements that were tied to the apron string of the OAU Liberation Committee was another means of cooperation among various movements. After the 1958 conferences in Ghana and the eventual formation of the OAU, with a united focus on decolonization and anti-apartheid struggle by the organization, a special fund was created by the continental political organization to disburse funds and overlook political, social and military developments amongst various movements in their respective sanctuaries. Expectedly, there tends to be a conflict of interests among the unwieldy movements. It was the duty of the OAU Committee on Liberation to maintain unity through the use of good offices among member states. With this, some of these movements not only received military training in various African states, but they also received training from the former Soviet Union, China and North Korea. The implication of this was that the friendships they established during their war of liberation helped them establish common economic and political institutions to further their general development.

Another plus in the formation of economic groupings in the sub-region is their common cultural heritage that straddles language and commerce. The Nguni language, which cut across many states in southern Africa made the coming together of the member states comparatively smooth. The Ndebele, SeSwathi, MoSotho, SeTswana and SeZulu are common languages in South Africa that are widely spoken and highly interrelated. Because Swahili is spoken in the states of Tanzania and Zambia, many of the guerilla fighters who spent a portion of their military training in either of the two states were well versed in Swahili. Liberation movements turned political parties after independence, expectedly form a

united front in fighting against apartheid system. Therefore, the coming together of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the Zimbabwe African National Organization Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) and the Liberation Front of Mocambique (FRELIMO) against South Africa was total.

Politico-Economic Relations from 1960s

Despite the volume of economic relations between South Africa and its neighbors, the issue of politics continues to be a scar in their relationship. The impact of Pan-Africanism on the leaders of the southern African states of Rhodesia and South Africa played more of a role in determining their economic and political interactions. Though it is well established that the degree of interdependence between the two camps cannot be ignored, the ideological dependence of the camps leads them to enact harsh and irrational policies towards each other. This is in contrast to the amount of financial, trade and labor that flows to and from the two camps. A lack of concrete institutional framework to regulate Pretoria and its neighbors' relationships causes instability. The involvement of extra South Africa in the internal affairs of Pretoria's system led to massive retaliation and to an export of conflict to the whole region. South Africa's coterminous states political objective was to promote liberation movements interest against minority regimes in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. This led to a sense of responsibility as brother's keeper according to the tenet of Pan-Africanism. This was in the form of political, financial and military support in waging war against South Africa and its puppets in Zimbabwe (Ian Smith), Namibia (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola, UNITA and Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola,

FNLA), Mozambique (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana, RENAMO) and Angola. The support that the neighboring states received from the Eastern bloc allowed South Africa to retaliate through *total strategy* and introduced securocratic⁴ government as a response to total onslaught on the rest of southern Africa. This takes many forms such as *blitzkrieg*, sponsoring opposition movements against *status quo* governments and *importation* of the capitalist states to support anti-communist intrusion in the sub-region.

South Africa's employment of alternative movements against her neighboring states paid off as the same movements were used to cause internal instability and a high degree of dependence on the South African goods and services. The activities of the Pretoria government through its protégés, UNITA and RENAMO, led to the closure of Lobito, Beira, Benguela and Nacala routes, which in turn caused Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Zimbabwe to experience certain political and economic disadvantages. The implication of this was that South Africa would have more revenue from unfriendly states because the perceived littoral states of Tanzania, Mozambique and Swaziland were denied access to their ports. It also brought about political understandings because of the way economic and transport diplomacy was craftily employed by South Africa. The only option, according to the above theory of interdependence, was to rely on the good will of South Africa for the importation and exportation of goods and services (Green & Thompson 1986: 245-80). The need to find a catholicon to this development was the formation of the SADCC by the frontline states in the form of what this paper regards as micro Pan-Africanism with the aim of furthering the objectives of the AAPO and CIAS founded by Kwame Nkrumah.

Economic and Political Roles of SADCC

South Africa's desire to create a constellation of states in southern Africa was dashed immediately when Zimbabwe received its political independence through liberation war. It was the opinion of Zimbabwe that it should regain its lost glory as a result of the Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain in 1965. With the formation of SADCC and mostly with the involvement of the perceived liberal southern African states of Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland and Lesotho in the anti-South Africa these moves were considered to be unfriendly acts which needed to be met with military might. Among the intensions of the SADCC was the need to further the aims and objectives of the Pan-African leaders, that is, to fight against minority rule and to abhor racial discrimination in Namibia and South Africa.

With the need for gradual political and economic integration of Africa pronounced, one of the cardinal objectives of the Frontline states became to abide by the UN Economic Commission for Africa's call for sub-regional economic cooperation with subsequent Africa Union in future. If this was the aim of the SADCC during its formative years, the issue of politics, which some scholars would term as inconsistent with economic ideas should not come to fore. To what extent this could be argued for is a matter of academic conjecture. This paper holds that an iota of economic move has some political undertone. This is the main departure of this section where we are to argue that admixture of politics and economics are involved in the formation of SADCC. Despite the organization's political power in attracting international solidarity and developing financial assistance against South Africa's incessant incursion to the member state's territory, it was not well equipped to serve as a hob in actualizing the

member states' foreign policy against Pretoria. This is because of the geography of the sub-region. Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland (BLS) instead advocated for a reduction in their degree of dependence on the apartheid state. Economic détente between BLS and South Africa is understandable because of their geographical reality. The Lesotho Highlands Water project with South Africa, Botswana and South Africa Multinational Corporation (MNC) and De Beers, in exploration of the state's diamond and juicy incentives to attract investment from South Africa by Swaziland are central to the very survival of these states. Zimbabwe and Zambia are two states that perceived their economic relationship as *negative interdependence* in favor of South Africa. They opted for Pan-African anti-apartheid stance.

Dissociation costs on Frontline states were so vast that they could not survive without Pretoria government. For many of these states, the degree of their dependency on South Africa, in form of both visible and invisible trade, in investment and other financial flows, in labor services and in infrastructures and institutions, was too precious to ignore (Blumenfeld 1992: 114). These variables put the member states in a corner where a comprehensive sanction⁵ as advocated by the organization black civil society in South Africa, Scandinavian countries and the communist states would want them to be. Malawi as a member of SADCC, for instance was contradictory. Its diplomatic relations with South Africa signified the extent to which the member states could not put their foot down on subjecting the apartheid enclave to a pariah status. Comparatively, the cost of their dissociation with Pretoria was higher than South Africa's. For instance, South Africa embarked on transport diplomacy against recalcitrant states such as Zimbabwe and Zambia. With Pretoria sponsoring insurgency within Mozambique and Angola

railway systems, the major means of transportation and the link to the international environment was disrupted. Thus, because of sabotage (bombing) and wars in Angola and Mozambique, the SADCC states could not make use of these routes. This forced them to come to term with South Africa, since it became a matter of life-or-death.

The collapse of ideological war in the international system had a direct impact on the political arrangement of the sub-region. This took the form of dissolution of the apartheid system, as Mandela and his co-jailer were released unconditionally. The liberation movements turned political parties in South Africa were unbanned. Before this, another political milestone was registered as Namibia received her formal independence from South Africa. These developments brought about a Tsunami of political changes, specifically in southern Africa. By 1992, SADCC started to revisit their stance on its future relationship with South Africa. In August of the same year, members of the SADCC met in Windhoek, the Namibian capital, and signed a Treaty and Declaration of SADC. Most important in this political and economic calculation was the need to integrate South Africa to the SADCC for economic development of the sub-region. In August 1994, South Africa's accession to SADC brought about a need to focus more on the economic development of southern Africa.

SADC as a Step away from the Pan-African Concept

The formation of SADC was not as smooth as the establishment of SADCC for various reasons. Personality problems between Nelson Mandela and Robert Mugabe dictate to some extent, the degree of tardiness in actualizing the establishment of the regional integration. Reasons for these are not too difficult to fathom. Mugabe held that the new

southern Africa economic and political arrangement would be tailor-made to suit his personal hegemonic ambition in the sub-region. At the same time, he wanted to regain the lost glory of Rhodesia that resulted from the *illegal* Ian Smith UDI government. On the other hand was South Africa's to remain the only credible power in southern Africa based upon international relations attributes of power. This development was not only against the initial ambition of Pan-Africanists of the unity of Africa, but it also reflected the conservative ideas of the ilk of Nigeria (Tafawa Balewa), francophone African states, save Guinea Bissau (Sekou Toure), Liberia and DRC (Mobutu Sese Seko) conception of Africa. Division of power in the sub-region, with more emphasis on security matters, also formed the crux of the disagreement between Pretoria and Harare. All these are going to receive some justification in the analysis of the post-apartheid southern African politics.

Two major schools of thought were developed from the integration procedure in southern Africa. One championed by the moderates was that the issue of economic and political relationships between member states should be on the stage of *the ladder of integration* on which participants progress from a preferential trade area to a free trade area before proceeding to a custom union. Participants then shift from a common market to economic union, before finally achieving political union (Bertelsmann 1998: 178). On the other hand was the radical school that advocates for political union to be addressed before other issues. The Pan-Africanists who were ready to forgo their state's sovereignty for a political union maintain the second position. This position is not applicable in southern Africa because of the way these states received their political independence from various colonialists. Perhaps the Lusophone states of Angola and Mozambique could venture into this idea but South Africa and Zimbabwe, which are the

main players in the SADC, are not ready for any arrangement that would change the existing *status quo*. The politics involved in the formation of the SADC confirm the mutual suspicion that exists between the two giants and credible states in maintaining balance of power and terror at the sub-regional level.

Admission of DRC as a member of the sub-regional organization, despite its location in central Africa, could be explained by Zimbabwe's urge to check the perceived preponderant power of South Africa. This was despite Kinshasa's political history in southern Africa during the Cold War period against progressive liberation movements. South Africa's intension in admitting DRC also could not be too far from the need to exploit the untapped natural resources of the state to further economic dominance of Pretoria in the sub-region. Therefore, DRC membership was interpreted by the two states as a means of furthering both political and economic objectives.

Development integration continues to be the preferred model of the members' relationships against the political intension of the SADC states in dislodging apartheid system in South Africa and Namibia. Therefore, the focus on trade and development of infrastructural amenities that eluded the member states because of Pretoria's *national strategy* against its coterminous states needed special focus. As much as Maseru Trade Protocol was drafted by the member states for liberalization of trade, there are some cogs to the achievement of this according to the Development Bank of Southern Africa (c.f. Bertelsmann 1998:181):

Its failure to provide for differential treatment for least developed countries;

Its emphasis on tariff barriers to trade when they are not the main obstacles to intra-regional trade;
The absence of provisions to address supply-side measures;
The call for the immediate national treatment of goods and services traded within the region;
Its attempt to create policy harmonization when it is not required from Free Trade Area (FTA);
The treatment of relationships of member states with other regional groupings;
Inadequate provisions to foster equitable industrial development in the region;
The absence of compensatory mechanisms; and
Its failure to address adequately prevailing trade imbalances in the region.

Because of the inadequacies of the principle of tariff problems to the development of the trade within the region, the Southern African Bank further proposed some solutions to the economic backwardness of the member states that usually create trade diversion for other members and trade creation for South Africa. The Bank therefore focuses on the need for equitable industrial development in the member states after addressing the following snags to industrialization:

Small size of domestic markets;
Poor ability to absorb new technologies;
Lack of technical skills;
Lack of product and market diversification;
Low investment;
Lack of harmonized tariff liberalization; and
Widespread poor infrastructural development in the region.

Despite the above-mentioned problems associated with the economic integration of some of the routes that were

sabotaged during the liberation wars and apartheid's desire to form a constellation of states.

The Beira Corridor, linking Harare with the port of Beira in Mozambique for the transportation of mineral resources and agricultural products;

The Benguela Corridor, linking Angola to the copper mines in the south of the DRC and Zambia;

The Malanje Corridor with intension of developing rail system in Angola;

The Nacala Corridor connecting Mozambique to Malawi and Zambia for the exploitation of mineral resources such as copper;

The Namibe Corridor to Menongue in Angola for the active transportation of Luanda natural minerals; and

The Tazare Corridor connecting Tanzania, Zambia, DRC and Angola

It should be pointed out that according to some political and economic analysts, the need to develop these areas could be linked to South Africa's desire to control the mineral resources of the SADC members. For instance, the development of the Maputo Corridor is being viewed as an attempt to make South Africa's manufactured goods available to its coterminous states to the east and north-east. The development of gigantic shopping malls along the route are not to satisfy the South African in the area, but as a means to create more jobs in the state as long as Swathis and Mozambicans would patronize these shopping complexes in Nelspruit and Malelane. The Corridor was constructed by private concession on Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) where it would not only benefit South African companies. Issues of security loom large in consolidating economic development. In achieving this, the

problem of security comes into prominence as discussed below.

Holistic Approach to the Concept of Security in SADC Region

The remaining security issues in the post-Cold War international system continue to reverberate in the mind of government officials, policy analysts, mass media and NGOs. In the post Soviet Union, the issue of security has transcended the military sphere where the size of the standing army and weapons of mass destruction are the *sine qua non* to power in international politics. Although, as this paper will later address, military security remains one of the contemporary conflict problems in Africa for a variety of reasons.⁶ The political mistrust between Zimbabwe and South Africa led to a misunderstanding at the SADC, where the two should instead acted as leaders for the other members to emulate. The initial political problems emanated from the issue of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security (the Organ). Mugabe wanted the Organ to be independent of the SADC as a security organization. Ironically, he was the chairperson of the Organ at the time, while Mandela was the chairperson of the SADC at the same time (1996). Because of the security implication of the Organ to the stability of the southern African region, Mugabe wanted to hold onto the security, and left the political and economic spheres to South Africa. The insistence by Mandela that the Organ was an integral part of the whole SADC triggered a crisis and a lack of trust between the two states. In order for Mugabe to entrench his political influence in the region, he formed an *unholy alliance* with some SADC member states to strengthen the Laurent Kabila government in the DRC. Angola and Namibia joined Zimbabwe in the war against the anti- *status quo* in the DRC for various reasons, which are examined elsewhere (Amusan, 1999: 27-34). Despite

this, South Africa and Zimbabwe appreciated the need to cooperate for the general development of the sub-region, realizing that the negative effects of any unpopular policy would have a direct effect on their respective state's stability. To curb this, spheres of influence were carved out for themselves and probably to work towards the general development of the sub-region and by extension Africa in general. While South Africa was in charge of finance and investment, Zimbabwe was asked to coordinate food, agriculture and natural resources' sectors on behalf of the SADC (Van Wyk, 1999:79).

Conclusion

While Africa needs political and economic development, the personal ambition of some of their leaders continues to militate against it. This is exactly what is affecting the southern African sub-region. The zeal at which the liberation movements united would have moved the sub-region forward in the form of general development despite the fact that in some instances they failed to agree on issues because of ideological differences. The introduction of globalization imposed on SADC members by various international financial institutions gave them a little room to maneuver in terms of homegrown politico-economic development in line with the founding fathers of Pan-Africanism. The need to open the market for international exploitation not only killed the DuBoisian model of Pan-Africanism, but it also exposed the sub-region to what Amechi Okolo (1986) terms as "Dependency: the Highest Stage of Capitalist Domination". South Africa, a capitalist state from its inception, rejuvenates the concept of Africa Renaissance. However, the commitment to the rebirth of Africa is not in line with the state policy

towards the SADC. This explains why the rest of the member states continue to perceive Pretoria as an exploitative hegemonic power that only looks after the interest of its socio-politico-economic development at the disadvantage of the other states. Its intension of absorbing the BLS and Namibia economically during the apartheid era still looms large in the Mandela-Mbeki administrations.

Notes

1. C.f. Edmondson, Locksley. 1974. 'Africa and the African Diaspora: Interactions, Linkages, and Racial Challenges in the Future World Order', in Mazrui, Ali A. and Patel, Hasu H. *Africa: the next Thirty Years*. England: Davison Publishing Ltd.
2. For the sake of this paper, we look into the composition of the southern African states to have transcended the geographical location of some states in the sub-region.

- Tanzania, Zambia and DRC suppose to belong to another region.
3. This is a term developed by Garrett Hardin (1968: 1243-8), its centre of argument is that any resources that is available to everybody without policy control tend to favour some and denied others access to it. It is zero-sum game where there is a need for either privatisation or social control as a regulatory system (Stiglitz 2006: 162-164, 322; Greene 1997: 321-3).
 4. President P. W. Botha elevated State Security Council to preside over intrusive bureaucratic system, known as the National Management System, with tentacles reaching into virtually every government department and into every corner of the country (De Klerk 1999: 115)
 5. For a proper understanding of the futility of sanctions imposition on another state, see (Rienow 1961: 285-7, Russett and Starr 1992: 171-3).
 6. The post Cold War international politics that is expected to bring unity, development and harmony through democratization instead elicited crises in Africa. Some of these crises are resulted from the need to control mineral resources either by a handful of political elite, warlords or MNCs. This claimed lives of thousands of people in DRC, Cote d'Ivoire, Angola, Sudan and to a smaller scale Nigeria. For more in-depth knowledge on this, see Reno. 1998 and Berdal and Malone. 2000.

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